Theories of collective choice

In democracies, decisions are taken collectively, either directly or through delegation. The role of political institutions is to aggregate potentially divergent opinions and preferences into common decisions. This course is an introduction to the economic approach of collective decision making, both from the normative point of view of the theory of social choice, and from the positive point of view of game theory.

Using formal theory and empirical knowledge, we present some of the major results on the working of political institutions, in particular the behavior of voters and political parties. We then consider their impact on several important policy dimensions (taxation, redistribution, the size of the government etc.), and on the comparative study of political systems.

Evaluation : Depending on the number of registered students, the grade for this course will be based either on a written exam or on the oral presentation of an article.

Enseignant(s) :

• Jean-François Laslier (jean-francois.laslier@psemail.eu)
• Antonin Macé (antonin.mace@psemail.eu)

Information pratique : S4, Campus Jourdan, cours de la formation M2 APE.